Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement
Publisher: Andrew Kydd
Volume: 28 pages, pdf
Description:
What determines the price of membership in an international institution? Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal hypothesize that uncertainty about the preferences of other states will increase that price, as stated in Rational Design conjecture M2, restrictive MEMBERSHIP will increase with UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PREF- ERENCES. When states are uncertain about the motivations of other states, they will demand costly signals of reassurance before being willing to cooperate fully.1 In a multilateral context, this may take the form of an institutionwith a signicant barrier to entry, a price of admission. The price of admission serves to separate states who are seriously interested in cooperation from those who have more exploitative motivations. More cooperative states will be willing to pay the price, and this will reveal their cooperative nature to others, facilitating cooperation. Less cooperative states will not be willing to pay the price, and this too will reveal their type, leading others to cooperate less with them.